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MEDIA POLICY FETISHISM 
 
Introduction: official and unofficial spheres of media policymaking 
 
Media policymaking is a disinterested and depoliticized sphere of activity. At least 
that is the claim of some of its most high-profile participants. Consider the language 
used by the former British culture secretary, Jeremy Hunt in response to accusations 
that he had compromised his impartiality in the light of his backing for News Corp”s 
bid to take over the British broadcaster BSkyB in 2010-11. When presented with 
evidence such as his messages to News International chairman James Murdoch 
congratulating him on European Union competition regulators waving the deal 
through—“Great and congrats on Brussels, just Ofcom to go” he texted in March 
2011 before then following up with a further message thanking Murdoch for his 
support and concluding that “think we got [the] right solution” (quoted in Wintour 
and Sabbagh, 2012)—he proclaimed his absolute independence in relation to the 
proposed acquisition (Hunt, 2012): 
 
like a judge I should set aside any personal views…and make my decision 
objectively and impartially on the basis of the evidence presented to me. I 
should not be biased or make the decision on party political grounds. It should 
be a case-specific decision taken with reference to the issue of plurality of 
media ownership and not on other policy considerations (such as the impact 
on jobs, for example). It was a decision I should make alone, not consulting 
cabinet colleagues and not bound by the conventions of collective cabinet 
decision-making. 
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This is an excellent statement of pluralistic policymaking in which a range of views is 
sought, the evidence is considered carefully and a decision is reached based only on 
the merits of the specific situation. Special interests are held at bay while the public 
interest remains paramount. 
 In this “official” view of the media policy process, policies themselves are 
framed by “experts”: special advisers, lobbyists, technologists, industry figures, civil 
figures, pressure groups and the odd academic. They are developed in formal spaces: 
in Parliaments and government ministries, in think tanks and boardrooms, in 
committee rooms and high-level seminars. Policies exist on pieces of paper and are 
often written in arcane parliamentary language; they are to be applied indiscriminately 
and expected to achieve measurable effects. Policies are predicated on the need to 
have clear rules and regulations, demonstrable laws and liabilities. They are tangible, 
rational and necessary prescriptions for a healthy, modern media ecology. This 
narrative resembles Robert Dahl’s classic study of the political system in New Haven, 
Connecticut, Who Governs? (Dahl, 2005 [1961]), where politics is dominated by 
coalitions, by rival groups of actors and interests, none of whom could be said to 
exercise complete control. According to Dahl, “there was no clear center of dominant 
influence in the [political] order. No single group of unified leaders possessed enough 
influence to impose a solution” (2005, p. 198) – not a government minister, lobbyist 
nor a media baron. 
 These rather hygienic accounts of the media policy process have been 
extensively challenged by theorists refuting the notion that power in contemporary 
decision-making situations is sufficiently dispersed. While Mills (1959) and Miliband 
(1969) spoke of the distortions of an ‘elite pluralism’ the serves the interests of a 
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dominant class, Poulantzas (1973: 141) argued that a hegemonic ‘power bloc’ was 
central to securing political consent. Lukes, in his work on the different ‘faces’ of 
power, contrasted the visible aspect of policymaking with a further dimension in 
which power is associated with an ideological capacity to shape the preconditions for 
decision-making in order to ‘secure compliance to domination’ (2005, p. 111). From 
the collusion between politicians and media executives that was identified in the 
Leveson Inquiry into the culture, standards and ethics of the press that was set up the 
British government following the phone hacking scandal (Leveson, 2012) to the 
impact of corporate lobbyists in overturning net neutrality rules in the US (Wyatt, 
2014), media policy has been revealed to be an area in which special interests 
dominate, in which money and influence plays a decisive role and in which short-term 
partisan priorities seem to trump long-term strategic considerations. Rather than being 
the “objective” and “impartial” process described by Jeremy Hunt above, it 
corresponds more closely to the description provided by Robert McChesney in The 
Problem of the Media where he argues that media policy making resembles a Mafia 
get-together where the heads of families divvy up the proceeds from a lucrative deal. 
“So it is with media policy making in the United States. Massive corporate lobbies 
duke it out with each other for the largest share of the cake, but it is their cake” 
(McChesney, 2003, p. 48). 
In these more radical accounts, media policy is not the clean, administrative, 
depoliticized and unproblematic evidence-based space in which it is sometimes held 
up to be by pluralists. Instead, it refers to a process driven by conversations in 
inaccessible corridors of government, private rooms in top-end restaurants, inner 
sanctums of corporate HQs and invitation-only seminars where the agenda is often set 
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and where solutions to current “problems” (to the extent that some issues are seen as 
problems and are others are not) are identified.  
Media policy is messy and dirty—not simply characterized by dirty money in 
the sense of outright corruption or the fundamentally distorting impact of lobbying—
but also because it cannot be separated from the ideological preferences, partisan self-
interest, corporate priorities and personal compatibilities that circumscribe the 
process. It is hardly conspiratorial to suggest that there may be a link between the fact 
that Tony Blair, prime minister of Britain for over 10 years, is godparent to Grace, 
Rupert Murdoch’s second youngest child, and the fact that no action was ever taken 
by his government to confront Murdoch’s media power in the UK. Even Vanity Fair, 
in a long article revealing the very intimate relationship between Tony Blair and 
Murdoch’s ex-wife Wendi Deng, felt confident enough to insist that “through the 
power of The Sun, and his other London newspapers, the Times and News of the 
World, Murdoch had virtually put Blair into office” (Seal, 2014). Policy, politics, 
power and personalities are far from insulated from each other. 
Media policy needs to be understood, however, not solely in terms of its 
association with elites as if it refers to a set of practices—whether practiced openly or 
covertly—that can only be undertaken by those with access to power and policy 
resources. It also refers to what Bill Kirkpatrick has eloquently argued as a 
“vernacular” practice: “the ways that unofficial media policies are formulated and 
enacted every day—in homes, schools, theatres, prisons, hospitals, stores, public 
places, and more” (Kirkpatrick, 2013, p. 636). Media policy, stripped of its exclusive 
character, is actually embedded in people’s lives and interacts with everyday practices 
of media consumption and production. Kirkpatrick gives the great example of how 
consumers used the $40 coupons provided by the US government to offset the cost of 
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digital set-top boxes in the mid-2000s in creative ways: to buy two boxes they didn’t 
need and then return them the next day in order to get store credit for something that 
they actually wanted. Focusing only on the “top-down” narrative “misses the dynamic 
and relational nature of how that official policy was translated and lived at different 
levels by a range of vernacular policymakers” (Kirkpatrick, 2013, p. 642). 
As well as the official and unofficial spheres of the visible policy process, we 
also need to consider the assertion that media policy is defined not simply by the 
laws, rules and practices it generates but by the issues around which it refuses to 
mobilize. These have previously been described these as “media policy silences” 
(author removed, 2010): the gaps in the process, the unasked questions, untabled 
agendas, uninvited players and unspoken assumptions that account for the non-
decisionmaking power at the heart of media policymaking. For example, why is the 
growing consolidation between internet service providers and content providers rarely 
seen by regulators as a threat to the “marketplace of ideas”. Why is it that “public 
subsidies” for public-oriented news are so often seen by policymakers as beyond the 
pale? Why is it that fixed limits on news market share are claimed not to enhance 
diversity but to undermine “commercial sustainability and innovation” (Ofcom, 2012, 
p. 2)? Why is the size of the publicly-funded BBC a “problem” while the size of 
Murdoch’s BSkyB, Britain’s largest broadcaster with revenues almost twice those of 
the BBC, is rarely commented on?  
Yet, while I think this approach is still very relevant and helps us to fathom 
both the contours and the absences of the policy environment, we need a 
complementary approach if we are fully to make sense of the framing and conduct of 
the policy debates that are very much in front of us: the uproar over an open internet, 
the scale of government surveillance, the battles over press freedom and the pursuit of 
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media pluralism to name just a few issues. I do not intend here to provide a detailed 
account of the nuances of these debates but instead to provide a theoretical approach 
that may explain how the emergence of media policies so often seems to take place 
independently of the actions of those on whose behalf the policies are allegedly 
developed. It is an approach that aims to illuminate why elites continue to dominate 
media policymaking, why—with significant exceptions—we (by which, throughout 
this article, I mean ordinary citizens and users of communications technologies) are 
usually absent from policymaking debates, and why even public interest advocates 
who do participate in these debates often feel so disenfranchised from the process. 
This is why I want to propose an emphasis in the rest of this article on the relationship 
between media policy and commodity production and, in particular, on the specific 
phenomenon of commodity fetishism.  
 
Commodity Fetishism  
 
Out of all the elements of the media world, few people would immediately identify 
media policy with practices of fetishism: the worship of things made by humans but 
then endowed with god-like status. One might argue that Mad Men, Game of Thrones, 
a Vertu Signature Cobra mobile phone, a Stuart Hughes iPad2 or a curved 105 inch 
high-definition TV are more obvious targets for fetishistic urges than the internal 
machinations of the Federal Communications Commission or ongoing debates 
concerning the regulation of broadband. In reality, very few people—policy wonks 
and the author of this article excluded—worship at the altar of media policy. Neither, 
following the more somatic practices of fetishism, is an interest in policy a simple 
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displacement for other mediated activities; it is not designed to distract us from the 
central pleasure point of our media world whatever that may be. 
Fetishism works at a much deeper level – shaping and distorting our 
relationship to products and processes that affect our lives. By drawing on ideas about 
commodity fetishism adopted initially by Karl Marx and developed by others 
including Georg Lukacs, Franz Jakubowski and the anthropologist Michael Taussig, 
this article aims to provide the basis for an understanding of media policy that is 
related to the systematic loss of control experienced by the vast majority of people 
under capitalism. 
At the heart of this process is the commodity which is where, indeed, Marx 
began his analysis of capitalism. For Marx, a commodity is “first of all, an external 
object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind” 
(Marx, 1977 [1867], p. 125). However, one of the distinguishing features of 
capitalism is that it values the things we produce through our own labour not 
particularly in terms of their usefulness but in terms of their ability to be exchanged in 
a free market – to put it crudely, not for their social utility but for their financial 
rewards. Diamonds, which have little social purpose, are extremely valuable while 
staples like flour or rice are far less desirable. In essence, a commodity is a 
phenomenon that acquires value when it is exchanged or, as Marx puts it in relation to 
capitalist commodity production, exchange value is “the necessary mode of 
expression, or form of appearance, of value” (1977, p. 128). 
Commodity production, therefore, is not an adjunct to but sits at the very core 
of capitalism. Indeed, many Marxists identify commodity production as the definitive 
feature of capitalism. For Georg Lukacs (1971, p. 83): “The problem of commodities 
must not be considered in isolation or even regarded as the central problem in 
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economics, but as the central, structural problem of capitalist society in all its 
aspects.” The Polish Marxist Franz Jakubowski echoes this point arguing that under 
capitalism, “social wealth appears as a vast collection of commodities. The 
commodity is therefore the root phenomenon of the capitalist economy and also of its 
ideological superstructure” (1976, pp. 87-88). This is why Marx refers regularly to the 
fact that while a commodity appears initially to be a quite straightforward thing—”an 
object with a dual character, possessing both use-value and exchange-value” (Marx, 
1977, p. 131)—it is, in reality, far more elusive: “a very strange thing, abounding in 
metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” (1977, p. 163). Commodity 
production refers not simply to an economic but also a deeply ideological process in 
which the world is turned upside down. 
 The key reason for this is the value of the labour—whether intellectual or 
physical— required to produce all commodities is transferred under market relations 
from the labourer to the products of her labour. Marx claimed that objects of 
production appear to workers as something outside of them, as external and strange, 
even though it is their labour that has produced them.  Instead of reflecting real social 
relations, labour becomes to be expressed in terms of relations between objects: 
between things and not between people. The “mysterious character” of commodities 
is explained simply by the fact that “the commodity reflects the social characteristics 
of men’s own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, 
as the socio-natural properties of these things” (Marx, 1977, pp. 164-65). So 
producers lose their intimacy with everyday goods and transactions that, in the 
context of capitalist relations, acquire a kind of  “mystical” power (1977, p. 164). 
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Marx originally turned to the concept of fetishism to describe the magical hold 
exerted by those very ordinary objects. Under capitalism a table, for example, is not 
just a table: 
 
The form of wood, for instance, is altered, if a table is made out of it. 
Nevertheless the table continues to be wood, an ordinary, sensuous thing. But 
as soon as it emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends 
sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on the ground but, in relation to 
all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden 
brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of 
its own free will. (1977, pp. 163-64) 
 
The wonder of capitalism is that it is able to persuade us that the value of the table lies 
not with the labour that produced it but inside the table itself. The table appears to 
have an objective character independent of and separated from the social relations 
under which it was created. What Marx was alluding to in his analysis of the strange 
and mysterious world of commodities that exert such a fascination on us was our loss 
of control, our alienation from the productive process. The crucial point is not simply 
that we overvalue external objects and processes but that, in the act of doing so, we 
undervalue ourselves. In other words, we give life to, we animate, external objects or 
processes and, in the act of doing so, diminish our own power. Michael Taussig 
captures perfectly this notion of disempowerment when he argues that fetishism 
“denotes the attribution of life, autonomy, power, and even dominance to otherwise 
inanimate objects and presupposes the draining of these qualities from the human 
actors who bestow the attribution” (Taussig, 1980, p. 31). 
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Commodity fetishism therefore involves the projection of mystery, beauty and 
awe to objects that we have produced while at the same time concealing the fact that 
it was us – or at least our labour – that produced these objects. Under commodity 
production, “a definite social relation between men…assumes, in their eyes, the 
fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx, 1977, p. 165). In this statement 
alone, Marx is attempting to capture the process by which the underlying dynamics of 
society—its “real” social relations”—are obscured. This does not mean that fetishism 
helps to produce a “false consciousness” that can be easily corrected through 
ideological realignment but instead that it generates a distorted picture of the world 
that is based on the very real experiences of exploitation and alienation suffered by 
workers under capitalism. 
There are five consequences of commodity fetishism that are worth 
considering briefly. 
First, fetishism naturalizes the whole process of commodification. What 
happens, according to Taussig, is that “an ether of naturalness conceals and enshrouds 
human social organization” (Taussig, 1980, p. 32). The beauty of the market is that it 
makes the valuing of objects above ordinary social relations seem so normal and an 
example of “common sense”. How we could do things otherwise? Why would we 
want to change something so “fantastic” as a consumer society predicated on the mass 
circulation of commodities? Fetishism is a crucial ingredient in the securing of 
consent to marketized social relations.  
Second, when we focus on external objects at the expense of privileging our 
own agency, we run the risk of decontextualizing social relations: the meaning lies in 
the “thing” itself as opposed to the circumstances in which it was produced or the 
networks of relationships between the producers. What is then lost is not simply the 
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context of social interactions but the prospect of a “totality” from which it is possible 
to assess and react coherently to events as they happen. Instead, social life becomes 
stripped of its central dynamics and fragmented. According to Jakuboswki, this is one 
of the most important consequences of commodity fetishism in that it not only 
naturalizes market relations but insulates its transactions from any overarching logic.  
 
The social division of labour creates a series of special sub-spheres, not only 
in the economy but in the whole of social life and thought. They develop their 
own autonomous sets of laws. As a result of specialisation, each individual 
sphere develops according to the logic of its own specific object. (Jakuboswki, 
1976, p. 95) 
  
This connects to the third consequence: the objectification of social life or, if 
you want to put it a little more crudely, the thingification of social relations and 
processes more generally. Georg Lukacs was rather more elegant when he talked of 
the phenomenon of “reification”, of the act of characterizing relations between people 
as “thing-like”. He argued that under conditions of market exchange, social 
relationships acquire a ““phantom objectivity”, an autonomy that seems so strictly 
rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the 
relation between people” (Lukacs, 1971, p. 83). Under capitalism, commodity 
fetishism leads to the experience of reification in which individuals are atomized and 
their relationships rationalized and bureaucratized.  
This, in turn, intensifies the alienation of ordinary people as they bear witness 
to the ongoing commodification of virtually the entire realm of social life that 
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includes, of course, the commodification of their own labour power. For Istvan 
Meszaros (1975, p. 35), alienation is  
 
characterised by the universal extension of “saleability” (i.e. the 
transformation of everything into commodity); by the conversion of human 
beings into “things” so that they could appear as commodities on the market 
(in other words: the “reification” of human relations), and by the 
fragmentation of the social body into “isolated individuals” who pursue their 
own limited, particularistic aims. 
 
Reification, therefore, is a consequence of a commodified society in which 
individuals lose a sense of their collective power and identity further increasing their 
disempowerment. Reification is not an experience that is unique to capitalism but its 
impacts are uniquely disastrous given the scale and intensity of commodity fetishism 
in market relations; only under capitalism can reification “penetrate society in all its 
aspects and…remould it in its own image” (Lukacs, 1971, p. 85). 
The fourth feature is that, through fetishism, the dynamics of the social world 
are mystified and made “spectral”. Commodity fetishism, according to Mike Wayne 
(2003, p. 194), “represses, rubs away and dematerialises the social relations of an 
activity or commodity and just leaves us with its physical materiality, isolated or with 
its interdependence with everything else fading away.” Social processes start to have 
a ghost-like appearance: we think we see them for what they are but they have a life 
of their own, independent of their own creators. For Jakubowski, it is in “capitalist 
commodity production alone that the false appearance is a general phenomenon” 
(1971, p. 90), leading not simply to the reification of social relations but the 
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systematic distortion of the lens through which we view the world around us. 
Similarly, Lefebvre (1968, p. 47) argues that the “commodity form possesses the 
peculiar capacity of concealing its own essence and origin from the human beings 
who live with it and by it. The form is fetishized. It appears to be a thing endowed 
with boundless powers.” Bauman contends that this is a phenomenon that is not 
restricted simply to production but also to consumption where what he describes as a 
“subjectivity fetishism” hides the “all too commoditized reality of the society of 
consumers” (Bauman, 2007, p. 14). 
Finally—and rather central to the topic of this article—this process of 
concealing material relations through the “objectification” of social life takes a 
particular form in commodity production through the creation of law and legal 
controls. “Under capitalism”, argues Jakubowski (1976, p. 94), “the generality of 
legal form, the displacement of all organic, traditional relationships by “rational”, 
legally regulated ones, is an expression of reification.” Market relations have 
obscured human interactions as the source of wealth and instead privileged principles 
of “objectivity” and “rationality” through a series of highly regulated relationships 
that are embedded in law and expressed as policies. 
 
Media policy and commodity fetishism 
 
How does all of this relate to the development of instruments of media law and 
policy? I would argue that the features of commodity fetishism outlined above are 
relevant both to commodities as tangible objects as well as to social interactions and 
political processes in which the interplay between individuals is displaced and instead 
in which these processes are seen as autonomous, independent and rational. It relates 
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to what many people perceive as our loss of control over politics and policymaking—
that it appears as a process that is utterly separate to us and fully reified—as part of a 
wider expression of political disengagement (Hay, 2007). 
This alienation from decision-making processes is especially noticeable in 
relation to media and communications practices that, after all, dominate so much of 
our waking lives. The average British person, for example, spends at least eight hours 
per day on communicative activity (Ofcom, 2013, p. 29) while a study for the mobile 
phone company O2 found that we spend far more time with our smartphones than 
with our partners (O2, 2013). Our lives are increasingly taken up with mediated 
interaction but we appear to have very little connection to or involvement in the 
policy debates that structure our communicative environment. 
 In part this is simply due to busy lives, the perception that policy 
environments require a level of expertise and resources that are simply out of the 
question for most citizens, and an instinct that the efforts of “outsiders” will be 
ignored. Yet even for many civil society activists and academics who take media 
policy debates very seriously, there is often a “spectral” quality to media policy – a 
“phantom objectivity” (as Lukacs put it earlier) that is attached to it. Speaking from 
the perspective of a media reform activist, I know I am involved in “media policy” (I 
receive the invitations to attend seminars and to offer submissions, to comment and 
critique) but the process itself feels far from tangible. Access to the core of the 
decision-making process always seems out of reach, shaped by external forces that are 
often neither present nor accountable. Yet at the end of the process, policies are then 
communicated to “stakeholders” as eminently sensible, scientific and rational 
responses to the given policy “problem”. Perhaps this “spectral quality” reflects the 
fact that, in a market environment, there is a slight defensiveness to the very existence 
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of media policies because, in reality, we should not really need them: broadband 
networks should build themselves, traffic should manage itself, parents can switch off 
the TV or turn on the filter, and editors are free to regulate their own behaviour. 
Media policy, in other words, is always trying to remove traces of itself – which is, of 
course, precisely what the state attempts to do under neoliberalism: to use its power to 
rub itself out, to make itself invisible (Mirowski, 2013).  
So what might be some of the features of this rather ghostly policy process? 
How might a concept of “policy fetishism” shape the dynamics of media 
policymaking? I want to mention five ways in which fetishism can be invoked in an 
analysis of the media policy process. 
The first dimension involves the evacuation of the meaning of key policy 
principles. Napoli (2001), author removed (2008) and Karppinen (2012) have all 
attempted to trace the genealogy of core policy concepts like pluralism, diversity, 
freedom and the public interest but all too often these terms are actually used in ways 
that distort their intended purposes. Just as Marx argues that exchange value trumps 
use value in the circulation of commodities, guiding principles that were designed to 
foster communicative equality are regularly deployed to protect corporate and elite 
interests. Freed from the contexts in which they were originally developed and 
mobilized by those in positions of power, they “appear as autonomous figures 
endowed with a life of their own” (Marx, 1977, p. 165) that is often in tension with 
their original meaning. For example, the tortured but nevertheless crucial notion of 
the public interest is all too often seen simply in terms of the satisfaction of the 
public’s appetite as opposed to a notion of the “common good”. This was most 
famously articulated by former FCC chairman Mark Fowler in the early 1980s when 
he argued that the “public’s interest…defines the public interest” (Fowler and 
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Brenner, 1982, pp. 3-4). This is a bit like saying that the state of public health ought to 
be measured simply by what the public actually consumes as distinct from any issues 
of nutritional value. We can see this evacuation of meaning taking place today in 
relation to ongoing debates concerning media pluralism and press freedom. 
Pluralism—the European policy framework for what US policymakers call 
diversity—is supposed to be a foundational principle that does two things: first, to 
provide citizens with a full range of information and second to break up undue 
concentrations of power (Ofcom, 2012, p. 1). But recent policy debates have been 
dominated by a commitment to secure pluralism that sees it not in terms of the 
equitable distribution of media power but as related to the promotion of consumer 
choice: of making the menu a little longer but not really looking at what is on the 
menu itself. Indeed, while there is a formal acknowledgement of its responsibility to 
promote diversity of expression, the UK government is quick to insist that “neither 
the Government nor any other body can compel people to consume a range of media 
voices, or control the impact that these voices have on public opinion” (Department 
for Culture, Media & Sport, 2014, p. 9). In a situation in which three companies 
control 70 per cent of daily newspaper circulation, a single news wholesaler provides 
bulletins for the vast majority of commercial radio stations and a single company 
dominates pay TV (Media Reform Coalition, 2014), the government has neutralized 
pluralism policy by rejecting “remedies” in favour of the “need to remain nimble in 
the face of great change” (Department for Culture, Media & Sport, 2014, p. 23). In 
the US, the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the 
organization that is responsible for securing competition, localism and viewpoint 
diversity in the communications sector, is a former cable industry lobbyist who is now 
leading the FCC’s review into the proposed merger of cable giants Comcast and Time 
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Warner Cable. Pluralism, at least in its execution, is to be presided over by interests 
that are very distant from the publics to which the policy objective ought to be 
accountable. 
There is a similar evisceration of the meaning of press freedom where, at least 
in the UK, there is a fierce—and thus far highly effective— backlash against 
government proposals for a new Royal Charter on press self-regulation led by 
newspapers claiming that they are the only guarantors of press freedom. This is 
despite the fact that it was their activities—the industrial scale of phone hacking, the 
privileged access of proprietors to politicians, and the press” refusal to tolerate any 
kind of independent audit of its activities (Davies, 2014)—that have so massively 
lowered the credibility of many news organizations in the public’s eyes. 
So to take a fairly typical example, one leading commentator used his column 
in the Mail on Sunday to insist that the proposed Charter would “bury three centuries 
of press freedom” (Nelson, 2013). Yet the article failed to provide a single example of 
how an oversight body of a self-regulator with no remit whatsoever to impose 
restraints on journalists would be able, single-handedly, to tame what its supporters 
regularly describe as a “raucous” press. Another commentator railed against the 
“chilling effect” of proposals for independent self-regulation and called as witnesses 
to her campaign against “illiberal state licensing of newspapers”  (Fox, 2013) such 
notables as John Stuart Mill, John Milton and even Karl Marx while totally ignoring 
the fact that we live in very different historical circumstances from those campaigners 
for a free press. Today, the most restrictive influence on journalists is generally not 
the pre-publication censorship of previous eras so much as the commercial imperative 
to secure exclusives and increase circulation whatever the ethical consequences. 
Where journalists do face overt sate intervention—often concerning security-related 
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issues—many proprietors and editors are suddenly less keen to prioritize “press 
freedom” over the “national interest” as demonstrated by the Sun’s accusation that the 
Guardian newspaper had committed “treason” simply for publishing Edward 
Snowden”s revelations about the scale of US and UK government surveillance 
(Liddle, 2013). The definition and deployment of key media policy principles is 
hegemonized in both these examples by a small circle of powerful insiders. 
The second dimension of media policy fetishism refers to the obsession with 
evidence and metrics inside the policy process. This is absolutely key to 
contemporary policymaking: if you do not have the facts and if you do not arrive with 
the data, then your argument is immediately devalued. Now I have no wish to dismiss 
the importance of evidence or to suggest that policy should somehow deride data, but 
I would simply wish to warn of the dangers of the “phantom objectivity” that is 
guiding a very subjective process. Facts are important but an “evidence-led” approach 
in itself is far from objective: just think back to the FCC’s rather discredited 
“Diversity Index” or indeed the disputes involving the FCC about which reports on 
media ownership to commission, who to commission them from and indeed which 
reports to publicize and which ones to hide (author removed, 2008).  
Yet quantitative data remains very much the “gold standard” of media 
policymaking despite the fact that policymakers “rely heavily on the datasets 
developed by commercial data providers for their clients and the investment 
community” (Napoli and Karaganis, 2007, p. 56) and not by public interest advocates. 
Indeed, such is the fetish for numbers that the UK government continues to delay any 
meaningful action to address a lack of pluralism until it has received from the 
regulator “a suitable set of indicators to inform the measurement framework for media 
plurality” (Department for Culture, Media & Sport, 2014, p. 7). The policy “problem” 
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is here defined not as an issue of concentrated media power but of the need to secure 
reliable numbers in an illustration of Jakubowski’s claim that positivism and 
empiricism “are characteristic of reified thought. The “facts” are torn out of their total 
context and reappear as the object of knowledge in their own right” (Jakubowski, 
1976, pp. 96-97). 
Third, policy fetishism also means that instead of having a genuine debate in 
which a diverse group of citizens collectively set the terms of debate and decide the 
agenda, the process is characterized by objectives that are largely taken for granted: 
for example, the intrinsic desirability of digital switchover or tougher enforcement of 
intellectual property rules or liberalisation of ownership restrictions. This is not to 
suggest that these objectives are necessarily undesirable in all circumstances but 
simply that the impact and benefits of many policy debates are rarely, if ever, 
discussed with the people whose lives they are supposed to transform (Dragomir and 
Thompson, 2014, p. 15). Nor, however, is it meant to suggest that policies are simply 
or mechanically imposed from above on a meek and vulnerable public but that 
fetishism refers to a set of social relations that are “lived” by ordinary people and 
regulated through the agenda-setting activities of experts, administrators and elites.   
The leads to a fourth dimension of policy fetishism: the lack of public 
participation in the process as a whole. Indeed, how do you take part in a process that 
seems so remote and indifferent to your contribution? According to Lukacs, 
reification reinforces our sense of confusion and our inability to shape the world 
around us: “The personality can do no more than look on helplessly while its own 
existence is reduced to an isolated particle fed into an alien system” (1971, p. 90). So, 
for example, where are the access points and the invitations to participate in the media 
policy process? How many “town hall” events and and public hearings are open to 
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engaged citizens (as distinct to the people who Comcast once paid to pack a meeting 
on net neutrality in 2008 [Stein, 2008])? All too often, entrance into the official policy 
process is by “invitation only” and opportunities for public participation largely 
consist of responding to government consultations on questions that have already 
been posed and on objectives already fixed. Indeed, public participation in the process 
is sometimes seen as unhelpful, partisan and ill-informed as revealed by a senior FCC 
official when reflecting on public input into proposals to liberalize media ownership 
rules back in 2002. 
 
Agencies have to make decision based on the facts and it’s not terribly helpful 
to ask the average person “what do you think of this” because they will give 
you an overly simplistic answer. It’s not their fault but they can’t possibly 
know all the stuff that goes into making those decisions. (Quoted in author 
removed, 2008, p. 103). 
 
The final aspect of policy fetishism I want to discuss lies in its ability to 
disguise the process itself: that we as citizens bestow decision-making power to an 
external force and, in doing so, to largely forget about our own investment in the 
situation. This is of course central to the ability of a narrow group of policymakers to 
be able to continue to dominate the process given that citizens, should they ever have 
the power to shape the policy agenda, might well have a different set of concerns 
beyond those of profitability, efficiency and state security. Fetishism helps to explain 
how we are prepared to “outsource” decisions about the shape of our media world to a 
process over which we have little control and little knowledge thus endowing 
established policymakers with a credibility and rationality that is far from deserved. 
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Sometimes the consequences of doing this hit home, for example when we realise that 
we are being surveilled, or that we no longer have a choice of cable providers or that 
our media simply fail closely enough to resemble “us”—understood as diverse and 
overlapping collectivities—and are prepared to do something about it. These moments 
are crucial (as I discuss below) but, for most of the time, media policymaking appears 
to be an activity that takes place on a distant galaxy. 
 
Is it possible to “liberate ourselves from fetishism”? 
 
The whole point of fetishism is that it disconnects publics from the true source of 
power and creativity in society so that we need to find a way of reconnecting 
ourselves to the capacity for change. One of the great strengths of Marx’s analysis 
was his insistence that, however durable and comprehensive commodity production 
may be, capitalism is nevertheless riddled with crises and contradictions (for example 
between use and exchange value or between the collective aspect of labour and its 
privatized appropriation) that simultaneously renders it unstable. Fetishism suggests 
mystery and transcendence but it is, at the same time, destructive, alienating and 
unsettling. In highlighting the process by which we cede control over the systems that 
we otherwise ought to shape, an understanding of fetishism can also suggest a way 
forward. “The task before us”, argues Taussig (1980, pp. 5-6), is “to liberate ourselves 
from the fetishism and phantom objectivity with which society obscures itself, to take 
issue with the ether of naturalness that confuses and disguises social relations.” There 
are three ways in which we might want to achieve this in relation to media policy. 
The first is methodological: that we should not insulate questions of policy 
from those of content and creative practice and from the spaces of media institutions 
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and flows. The artificial separation that we often see in academia between media 
policy on the one hand and media production and consumption on the other weakens 
all of us. The aesthetic strategies, creative endeavours and forms of resistance that 
may or may not be present in popular, everyday communication are critically related 
to the wider structural contexts of media environments in which certain types of 
behaviour and certain political preferences are rewarded or marginalized. The ability 
not simply to talk “truth to power” but to represent the voices of ordinary people, to 
speak in dialect, to open up conversations that others do not want to open up, to 
reflect the way a society is headed—all these are dependent on the policy choices 
debated and enacted in any contemporary mediated society.  
The second approach is to advocate ways in which to reconnect media policy 
to the publics on whose basis it is supposed to be enacted. In part this can be achieved 
through the work of specific media reform movements that have sought not simply to 
overturn existing policy approaches but to involve publics more broadly inside this 
process. Campaigns such as OpenMedia.ca’s “Stop the Squeeze” initiative against the 
domination of Canadian wireless by three giant companies, the more than one million 
signatures gathered by activist groups in the US in 2014 calling on the FCC to 
reintroduce Net Neutrality rules or the mass online campaigns in recent years against 
ACTA in Europe and SOPA in North America are all important means through which 
to restore the agency of citizens in relation to decision-making processes.  
This re-connection, however, is not exclusively the domain of media 
reformers per se but of movements for social justice more generally. Demands for 
media reform are an increasingly familiar sight in democracy movements across the 
world – from Mexico, where student activists in Yo Soy 132 challenged the duopoly 
of Televisa and TV Azteca (Abraham-Hamanoiel, forthcoming) as part of a wider 
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challenge to elite power, to Malaysia, where demands for the relaxation of media 
controls were part of that country’s electoral reform movement in 2012 (Hodal, 
2012); and from Turkey, where the refusal of mainstream TV channels to cover the 
attacks on peaceful demonstrators in Gezi Park in 2013 led to protests outside 
broadcast outlets (Girit, 2013), to Greece where, also in 2013, the shutdown of the 
public service broadcaster in the name of austerity measures was met with an 
occupation of the broadcaster (Sarikakis, 2014) and a further questioning of the 
government’s austerity agenda. 
Finally, there is a need to contest the domination of the media policy process 
by vested interests—whether in government or in corporate boardrooms—and to 
inculcate a policymaking culture driven by a radical (that is, an unreified) concept of 
the public interest and a commitment to participatory democracy. That will require 
not just more inclusive policy networks but a fundamental challenge to the power 
relations that underscore existing policymaking structures and agendas. The rejection 
of the ideological mystification supported by fetishism will involve battles fought not 
simply in the realm of ideology but of the material distribution of resources. It is an 
incredibly difficult task made more difficult by the incorporation of large sections of 
the media into precisely those power relations but nevertheless one in which ordinary 
viewers, listeners and users have a strategic democratic interest. 
 In the context of intensive commodity production, an alienated citizenry and 
an unaccountable decision-making process, we need an approach to media policy that 
is technologically informed but not deterministic; openly ideological as opposed to 
purely administrative; political as opposed to partisan; interested as opposed to 
disinterested; and committed to delivering social justice instead of serving the 
interests of either state or private elites.  When we think about questions of ownership 
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or net neutrality or digital switchover or press freedom, we need to think of policy as 
both an empirical fact and an ideological tool: that it is both a means of solving a 
“problem” and an instrument with which to democratize and equalize our 
communicative environments. Media policy, in other words, needs to be considered in 
relation to media reform and social change. If we do so, we can try to transform 
media policy from being a fetish to be an instrument designed to deliver real pleasure: 
a media system run for our benefit and not for the pockets of moguls, the egos of 
politicians or the imperatives of governments. 
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